Belief, knowledge and practical matters

Introduction PART I Pars Destruens 1.Knowledge and Practical Matters 1 Practical factor effects on knowledge ascriptions 1.2 The knowledge norm of practical reasoning 1.3 Pragmatic encroachment on knowledge 1.4 Problems for pragmatic encroachment 1.5 Moderate invariantist accounts of the practical factor effects on knowledge ascriptions 1.6 Criticisms to the knowledge norm of practical reasoning 1.7 Concluding remarks 2.High Stakes and Iterated-knowledge 2.1 The iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases 2.2 Counterintuitive appropriateness 2.3 Higher-order reasoning/knowledge and practical rationality 2.4 Non-luminosity,higher-order belief and blameworthiness 2.5 Concluding remarks ¡­¡­