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µ¼ ¶Á VOLUME I CHAPTER I. THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH
Statement of points of view. Logico-experimental and non-logico-experimental sciences. Differences between them. The experimental field is absolutely and in all respects distinct from the non-experimental field. In these volumes we are to confine ourselves strictly to the experimental field. Our research is essentially relative, essentially contingent, and all the propositions we enunciate are to be taken as valid only “within the limits of time, space and experience known to us.” Such a research is in process of continudus development; it proceeds by successive approximations and in no wise aims at attaining the certain, the necessary, the absolute. The language of the logico-experimental and non-logico-experimental sciences and ordinary language. Explanation of various terms that are used in these volumes. Definitions are mere labels that are used to help us keep track of things. Names defined in that way may be replaced at will with letters of the alphabet. CHAPTER II. NON-LOGICAL CONDUCT
Definition and classification of logical and non-logical actions. The latter are sometimes admirably adapted to the realization of logical purposes. Non-logical action in animals. In human beings. Human language. In human beings non-logical impulses are sometimes expressed in language. Theology and rites of worship. Theories and the facts in which they originate. Different intensities in different peoples of the forces that hold certain non-logical inclinations together and of the forces that prompt innovation. The Romans and the Athenians, the English and the French. Mysterious powers that words seem to have over things. The extreme limits of theological and metaphysical theories. In the manifestations of non-logical impulses there is a constant element and an element that is exceedingly variable. Example: Weather-magic. Interpretations adapt themselves to the non-logical inclinations of people. They show a multiple evolution. A first encounter with the necessity of making a sharp distinction between the logico-experimental truth of a doctrine and its social utility or any other utility that it may have. The logical form human beings give to non-logical actions. CHAPTER III. RATIONALIZATION OF NON-LOGICAL CONDUCT
If non-logical actions are of such great importance how have the many men of talent who have concerned themselves with human societies failed to perceive them? They have perceived them, now taking them into account implicitly, now considering them under other names without arriving at any general theory, now noting the particular case without grasping its general bearing. Examples from various authors. The imperfection, from the scientific standpoint, of ordinary language tends to promote logical interpretations of non-logical conduct. Examples. Human beings are somehow prone to shun considering non-logical actions and therefore to disguise them with logical vestments1 of one sort or another. Classification of the devices that are used for that purpose. Comment on the various categories. The attitude of practical men towards non-logical conduct. CHAPTER IV. THEORIES TRANSCENDING EXPERIENCE
The ordinary terms “religion,” “morality,” “law.” Do they correspond to anything definite? Study of the term “religion.” The terms “natural law” and “law of nations.” Type-doctrines and deviations from them. The materials that go into theories and the nexuses1 by which they are brought together. Examples. The use sociology makes of facts. The unknown has to be explained by the known. The present helps to an understanding of the past and to some lesser extent the past to understand the present. Probability of the conclusions that science reaches. Classification of propositions that add something to the uniformity that experience reveals, or which ignore it. Study of abstract entities known independently of experience. CHAPTER V. PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
How get from a theory to the facts in which it may possibly originate? Theories in which abstract entities are explicitly referred to origins that lie beyond experience. Summary of the results that our induction so far has achieved. The chief one is that in non-logico-experimental theories, c, there is a quasi-constant element, a, and a very variable element, b. The element a is the principle that is functioning in the mind of the human being, b is the explanation he gives of it or of the conduct which it inspires. Some examples. In theories that add something to experience, premises oftentimes are left at least partially implicit, yet those premises play a very important rôle in the reasoning that is used to constitute the theory. Efforts that have been made to derive doctrines, c, from arbitrary principles, a. VOLUME II CHAPTER VI. RESIDUES: COMBINATIONS AND GROUP PERSISTENCE
Had we been following a deductive procedure this chapter would have stood first in this work. Resemblances and differences, as regards the elements a and b, between logico-experimental and non-logico-experimental sciences. The element a corresponds to certain instincts but is far from covering them all. Furthermore, interests too have to be considered among the forces determining social forms. Objective and subjective aspects of theories. Examples of a technique for distinguishing a from b. We finally assign names (they are quite arbitrary) to the things a, b and c, for mere convenience in talking about them: we call the things a “residues,” the things b “derivations,” the things c “derivatives.” Residues as corresponding to instincts are devoid of any exactness. An analogy between the investigations we have been making in social phenomena and investigations in philology. That analogy arises in the fact that language is just one among the many social phenomena. Classification of residues. Study of Classes I and II. CHAPTER VII. RESIDUES: ACTIVITY AND SOCIABILITY
Study of Classes III and IV. Chapter VIII. RESIDUES: INDIVIDUAL INTEGRITY AND SEX
Study of Classes VI and VI.
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