°üÓÊ ÆõÔ¼ÀíÂÛÔÚÎÞÏßЭ×÷ͨÐÅÍøÂçÖеÄÓ¦ÓÃ

Chapter 1 Introduction
1£®1 Wireless Cooperative Networks
1£®2 Book Scope and Contributions£®£®
1£®3 Book Organization

Chapter 2 Contract Theory
2£®1 Basic Contract Concepts
2£®2 Adverse Selection
2£®3 Moral Hazard
2£®4 Summary

Chapter 3 Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks under Asymmetric Information
3£®1 Introduction
3£®2 System Model and Problem Formulation
3£®2£®1 Source Modeling
3£®2£®2 Relay Node Modeling
3£®2£®3 Contract Formulation
3£®3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information
3£®4 Optimal Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information
3£®4£®1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
3£®4£®2 Optimal Contract Design
3£®5 Results and Discussion
3£®5£®1 Symmetric Information Scenario
3£®5£®2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
3£®5£®3 Symmetric Information and Asymmetric Information Scenarios
3£®6 Summary

Chapter 4 A Contract-Based Model For Multiuser Cooperative Relay In Wireless Communication Networks
4£®1 Introduction
4£®2 System Model
4£®2£®1 Source Modeling
4£®2£®2 Relay Node Modeling
4£®2£®3 Contract Formulation
4£®3 Optimal Contract Design with Single Source
4£®3£® 1 Problem Formulation
4£®3£®2 Iterative Algorithm
4£®4 Optimal Contract Design with Multiple Sources
4£®4£®1 Problem Formulation
4£®4£®2 Iterative Algorithm
4£®5 Results and Discussions
4£®5£®1 Single Source's Relay incentive
4£®5£®2 Multiple Sources' Relay incentive
4£®5£®3 Convergence Analysis of Iterative Algorithm
4£®6 RNs' Power Constraint Effect
4£®7 Summary

Chapter 5 Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Moral Hazard
5£®l Introduction
5£®2 System Model
5£®2£®1 Source Modelling
5£®2£®2 Relay Node Modelling
5£®2£®3 Contract Formulation
5£®3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
5£®4 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
5£®5 Results and Discussions
5£®5£®1 Symmetric Information Scenario
5£®5£®2 Asymmetric Information Scenario
5£®6 Summary

Chapter 6 Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks
6£®1 Introduction
6£®2 System Model and Problem Formulation
6£®2£®1 Utility of Mobile Users
6£®2£®2 Utility of Service Provider
6£®2£®3 Contract Formulation
6£®3 Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
6£®4 Analysis and Discussion
6£®5 Numerical Results
6£®6 Summary

Chapter 7 Contract Design for Relay Incentive Mechanism Under Dual Asymmetric Information In Cooperative Networks
7£®1 Introduction
7£®2 System Model and Problem Formulation
7£®2£®1 Source Modelingz
7£®2£®2 Relay Node Modeling
7£®2£®3 Contract Formulation
7£®3 Optimal Contract Design under Symmetric Information Scenario
7£®4 Optimal Contract Design under Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7£®5 Optimal Contract Design under Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7£®5£®1 Feasibility Conditions for Optimal Contract Design
7£®5£®2 Optimal Contract Design
7£®6 Results and Discussions
7£®6£®1 Symmetric Information Scenario
7£®6£®2 Single Asymmetric Information Scenario
7£®6£®3 Dual Asymmetric Information Scenario
7£®7 Optimal contract design with the RNs' continuous types
7£®8 Summary

Chapter 8 Monitoring Strategy for Relay Incentive Mechanism in Cooperative Communications Networks
8£®1 Introduction
8£®2 System Model and Problem Formulation
8£®2£®1 Relay Nodes Modeling
8£®2£®2 Source Node Modeling with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8£®2£®3 Source Node Modeling with Monitoring Strategy
8£®2£®4 Contract Formulation
8£®3 Optimal Contract Design with Non-Monitoring Strategy
8£®4 Optimal Contract Design with Information-Monitoring Strategy
8£®4£®1 Stage III£º RNs' behaviors
8£®4£®2 Stage II£º MN's decision
8£®4£®3 Stage I£º Source's decision
8£®5 Optimal Contract Design with Action-Monitoring Strategy
8£®5£®1 Stage II£º MN's Decision
8£®5£®2 Stage I£º Source's Decision
8£®6 Results and Discussions
8£®7 Impact of RNs' Relay Effort Constraint
8£®8 Summary

Chapter 9 Dynamic Contract Design for Cooperative Wireless Networks
9£®1 Introduction
9£®2 System Model and Problem Formulation
9£®2£®1 Relay Node Model
9£®2£®2 Source Model
9£®2£®3 Contract Formulation
9£®3 Dynamic Contract Design under Asymmetric Information Scenario
9£®3£®1 Contracting Design in Period 2
9£®3£®2 Contracting Design in Period 1
9£®3£®3 Optimal Contract Design
9£®4 Simulation Results and Discussion
9£®5 Summary

Chapter 10 Conclusion and Future Works
10£®1 Conclusion
10£®2 Future works
References
About the Author